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Abstract 
We develop a new semantics for defeasible infer­
ence based on extended probability measures al­
lowed to take infinitesimal values, on the inter­
pretation of defaults as generalized conditional 
probability constraints and on a preferred-model 
implementation of entropy-maximization. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Probabilistic and default inference, emphasizing either 
fme- or coarse-grained uncertainty management, scienti­
fic or commonsense analysis, constitute the cornerstones 
of plausible reasoning. Probabilistic approaches are based 
on a well-established, largely canonical mathematical 
framework and have a long tradition of successful ap­
plications in numerous areas. In addition, they have been 
recently strengthened by more qualitative accounts allow­
ing an efficient encoding and exploitation of structural in­
formation, e.g. about independencies and causal relation­
ships. Default formalisms, on the other hand, have a less 
impressive record. In fact, after fifteen years of intensive 
research, the discipline is still characterized by a confusin­
gly large number of competing, partly quite isolated pro­
posals, which are often ad hoc, poorly motivated and fre­
quently unable to produce either answers we would expect 
or at least explanations why our expectations would be 
misleading. Nevertheless, there are lots of inferential tasks 
involving uncertainty - more or less efficiently executed 
by humans - where standard numerical representations 
and strategies turn out to be computationally expensive, 
cumbersome, non-intuitive or even meaningless. So, there 
is still a strong feeling that we need the concept of a 
default for practical reasoning and, hopefully, that we 
should also be able to make explicit our corresponding 
intuitions. 
The most promising approaches - at least as far as foun­
dational coherence and arguably correct behaviour are 
concerned- appear to be those derived from the probabi­
listic paradigm, e.g. ranking measures for interpreting 
default conditionals [Wey 91, 94] and revisable belief 
strengths [Spo 90], and the limiting-probability accounts 
for defeasible inference based on minimal information 
and indifference principles [GMP 90, BGHK 93]. There 
are several reasons why the quasi-probabilistic perspec­
tive is particularly attractive. First, it helps us to avoid 
serious conflicts between default conclusions and probabi­
listic judgments. Here, we should keep in mind that pro­
bability theory is strongly backed not only by practical 
considerations, but also by foundational reflections about 
rational behaviour. Next, it makes it easier to evaluate 
how reasonable or reliable our defeasible reasoning pat­
terns are, because we obtain a reference point allowing us 
to identify and clarify the assumptions, simplifications 
and compromises behind our inference philosophies. A 
further advantage is the possibility to exploit some power­
ful classical probabilistic tools. Last but not least, this ap­
proach facilitates decision-theoretic investigations, which 
are the main purpose of plausible reasoning in the real 
world. 
In this paper, we are going to continue this research 
program and present an integrated tt:amework for e�­
tended probabilistic and default reasonmg, whose tas� ts 
to offer a powerful normative background for practical 
realizations. More precisely, we are going to interpret 
defaults by generalized probability constraints, which 
opens the way to the implementation of promising new 
plausible inference strategies. We begin with a critical 
look at the ranking measure paradigm for default know­
ledge and propose to replace it by a more powerful sem­
antic perspective using nonarchimedean probability mea­
sures, i.e. distributions allowed to take infinitely small (� 
0) values. A central idea is to develop defeasible entail­
ment strategies based on extended information-theoretic 
notions. But to achieve this, we need valuation algebras 
offering more sophisticated algebraic tools, like exponen­
tiation or logarithmization, as well as some sophisticated 
results from model-theoretic algebra. On top of these non­
standard measures, we investigate and discuss several 
possible interpretation policies for defaults. Based on this, 
we then propose a general four-step-methodology for de­
feasible inference. In particular, we exploit nonarchi­
medean entropy maximization to implement the minimal 
information philosophy for nonmonotonic inference. This 
amounts to define a suitable preference relation on non-
archimedean probability distributions, which allows us to 
validate Lehmann's postulates for preferential inference. 
To conclude, we provide a comparison with other popular 
approaches and illustrate our entailment relations and 
their competitors by the way they handle relevant bench­
mark problems. 
2 RANKING MEASURE SEMANTICS 
What is a default ? Generally speaking, it is a binary 
relationship between propositions, written cp -» 'Jf, whose 
role is to guide plausible inference processes. In practice, 
accepting a default cp -» 'I' means that if cp were the only 
fact we knew, then we would be willing to assume or ex­
pect that 'Jf is true as well. In what follows, we are going 
to adopt the descriptive paradigm, which sees defaults as 
representing strong conditional expectations effectively 
anchored in some objective or subjective reality. That is, 
they are supposed to have global truth conditions and to 
tell us - in a very simplified manner - something about 
common or normal relationships in the real world resp. in 
our epistemic model of it. This reading immediately sug­
gests a quasi-probabilistic semantics for default know­
ledge, which may be informally described by 
• cp -)) 'Jf holds iff P(-ij!l cp) is extremely small. 
How should we interpret P and "extreme smallness"? A 
first possibility would be to use a coarse-grained form of 
quasi-probabilistic valuations called ranking measures. 
This approach was originally advocated in [Wey 91] and 
further developed in [W ey 94] 1. 
Defmition 2.1 A function R : B -> V is called a ranking 
measure iff 
1. � = (B, ('), u, -, 0, 1) is a boolean algebra (e.g. of pro­
positions), 
2. V = (V, *• «) is a ranking algebra : (V\{ -oo }, *• «) is 
the ne�ative half of a nontrivial ordered commutative 
group with identity o and, for all ve V, -oo i! v ( «-mi­
nimum) and -oo * v = v * -oo = -oo (absorptive for * ), 
3. For A, A' e B, R(A u A') = max« { R(A), :R(A')} and 
R(O) = -oo, R(1) = o, 
4. R(A) = -oo if A= u� { Ai I ie I} and, for all ie I, :R(Aj) 
= -oo (coherence). 
The conditional ranking measure corresponding to R is 
defined by the equations R(A (')B)= R(B I A) * :R(A) 
for R(A) ::!- -oo, and R(B I A) = -oo for R(A) = -oo. 
Ranking measure values can be seen either - on the objec­
tive side - as coarse, simplifying representations of ex­
treme probabilities in the real world or - on the subjective 
side - as rough degrees of disbelief or potential surprise, 
i.e. the smaller R( -,A), the stronger our belief in the pro-
1 It turns out to generalize Spohn's natural conditional functions 
[Spo 90], i.e. Pearl's x:-rankings , and Dubois and Prade's [DP 
88] possibility measures. 
2 (G, *• «)is an ordered commutative group iff* is associative, 
commutative, has a neutral element, admits inverses and « is a 
strict total order satisfying x « y -> X*V « Y*V. 
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position A. So, R (A) « R (B) basically means that in 
some sense, A is negligible w.r.t. B. For us, the main role 
of ranking measures is to provide a transparent descrip­
tive monotonic semantics for default implication. In fact, 
extreme smallness can be expressed in a natural way by 
"« o". LetL be a first-order language and �L = (BL, &, v, 
, F, T) be the corresponding (compact) boolean Linden­
baumalgebra3 induced by first-order predicate logic. The 
standard ranking measure semantics for defaults is now 
easily given (for cp, 'I' E L) by 
• R satisfies cp -)) 'Jf iff R( -lJf I cp) « o 
iffR(cp&-,'IJO «R(cp&'Jf) orR(cp&-,'IJO = -oo. 
For this interpretation, a sound and complete axiomatiza­
tion of default conditionals is offered by (an object-level, 
boolean version of) Lehmann's rational conditional logic 
[Wey 91]. We could now strengthen our default concept 
by imposing more restrictive bounds on the correspon­
ding conditional ranking measures, e.g. R(-lJf I cp) « e or 
R(-lJf I cp) i! e fore« o. It is not difficult to see that under 
this reading, the rules of preferential conditional logic 
[KLM 90] are still guaranteed. However, rational mono­
tony (a. -)) � and not a. -)) -,ri. implies a.&a.' -)) �) is no 
longer valid, as the following example shows. Suppose, :R 
is a Spohn-type K-ranking, i.e. a ranking measure whose 
ranking algebra is based on the additive structure of nega­
tive integers ({ -oo, ... -2, -1, 0}, +,<) and which verifies 
R(-<p) = -2, R(-<p&'Jf) = -2 and R(cp&'Jf) = -1. Interpret­
ing a. -)) � by R( -f3 I a.) « -1 ( « 0), we then get T -)) cp, 
but neither T -)) -ijl nor 'I'-)) cp, because R(-<p IT)= -2, 
R('Jf 11) = -1 and R(-<p I 'Jf) = -1. But, there are also more 
basic problems affecting the ranking measure approach. 
1. It is too coarse-grained for most decision-theoretic 
purposes. For instance, we cannot make a difference bet­
ween a situation where we have gotten 100 positive and 1 
negative equally plausible outcomes and one where the 
the odds are inversed. The main reason is that equal ran­
king measure values don't add up. 
2. It is somewhat isolated from standard probabilistic 
approaches, because its valuation structures are too rudi­
mentary. This means that there are only indirect possibili­
ties to exchange informations and powerful methods. Fur­
thermore, it is difficult to give a precise, objective mean­
ing to ranking measure values. On the other hand, a direct 
connection to or a common ground with the fine-grained 
world of real probability could well provide a better theo­
retical understanding making it easier to motivate, 
develop and investigate more reasonable quasi-probabilis­
tic plausible consequence relations for default knowledge. 
However, we should not forget that the classical probabi­
listic approach itself has notorious defects. For instance, it 
may be inappropriate when precise numbers are not re­
quired, unavailable or meaningless and the computational 
costs become disproportionate w.r.t. to the inferential 
3 For the sake of notational economy, we sloppily denote the 
elements of BL (the sets of classically equivalent L-formulas) by 
their representatives from L. 
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needs. This is and was a major justification for the switch 
to ranking measures. But probability measures are also 
haunted by technical and foundational weaknesses. A very 
prominent one is the non-existence of uniform distribu­
tions on infinite sets as long as we want to ban non-empty 
sets with vanishing probability, reserving measure zero 
for real impossibility. The difficulties to represent re­
visable - i.e. belief negations with non-zero probability -
plain belief - i.e. closed under conjunction and logical 
consequence - in a natural way by classical subjective 
probabilities, interfer with the desire for dynamic logical 
accounts [Spo 90]. Standard probabilistic threshold inter­
pretations for defaults are easily seen to be absolutely un­
suitable. Translating <p -» 'I' by P(-lJI I <p) �a, for non­
zero c:x, would be completely ad hoc and in flagrant con­
flict with our intuitions. But P(-lJI I <p) � 0 is inacceptable 
as well because it would necessarily induce the trivializa­
tion of defaults with an exceptional antecedent, e.g. auto­
matically validating <p&-lJI -» -,cj> and cp&-,'1' -» cj>. So, 
there are several reasons to look for an extended frame­
work. 
3 NONARCHIMEDEAN PROBABILITIES 
We have seen that the traditional probabilistic as well as 
related coarse-grained approaches both fail - for different 
reasons - to meet our expectations. The major remaining 
alternative then is to consider generalized probability 
measures using more fine-grained valuation algebras ex­
tending ([0, 1], +, x, <). Because we want to conserve as 
much of the classical probabilistic context as possible, the 
most interesting candidates are finitely additive measures 
takinj their values from the unit interval of some ordered 
field IR1 = (R 1, 0, 1, +1, x', <') properly extending the 
standard ordered real number field IR = (R, 0, 1, +, x, <), 
ie. R1 :2 R s.t. the restrictions of+', x', <' to R are just+, 
x, <5. First, note that such an IR 1 is necessarily a non­
archimedean extension of IR, i.e. it includes e ::J:. 0 with 
-r < e < r for every strictly positive standard real r. These e 
are called infinitesimals. To deal with them, we define for 
0 �a, b e  R1 the much-smaller-than-ordering <<. a << b 
iff a < r x b for all standard reals r > 0. This makes << a 
strict total pre-order on the positive half of R1• Because 
we are going to need an extended logarithm function for 
defining information measures aimed at nonarchimedean 
probability distributions, in fact, we have to look for pro­
per extensions IR 1 of the real ordered exponential field 
IRe= (R, 0, 1, +, x, exp2, <),where exp2(r) stands for 2r. 
Let LEF be the first-order language of ordered exponential 
fields and LEp(R) be the expansion of LEF by constants r 
for each real number r. The existence of such IR1 is now 
guaranteed by the compactness theorem ( { <p I I  Re I= <p, 
<pe LEp(R)} u { 0 < x, x < r I re R} is finitely satisfiable 
over Re, hence satisfiable). There exists a correct, pre­
sumably imcomplete axiomatization RCE of the LEF-
4 An axiom set for ordered fields can be found in [Bac 90]. 
5 To ease notation, from now on, we are going to use the same 
relational/functional notation for structures and their extensions. 
theory Th(IRe) of the authentic real ordered exponential 
field. 
Definition 3.1 Let R C F  be the theory of real closed 
ordered fields, i.e. ordered fields where every polynomial 
of odd degree has a root(= theory oflR). The structure IF 
= (F, 0, 1, +, x, exp, <) is called an ordered real closed 
exponential field iff IF verifies RCE = RCF + E1 - E4, 
E1 exp( l)  = 1+1, exp(v + w) = exp(v) x exp(w), 
E2 v < w � exp(v) < exp(w), 
E3 O< v � 3w exp(w)= v, 
E4 n2 < v � vn < exp(v), for neNat (vn = v x ... x v). 
The corresponding logarithmic function log is defined by 
log(v) = w iff (v � 0 and w = 0) or (exp(w) = v). 
Of course, for practical and foundational reasons, IR1 
should be as close to IRe as possible. A straightforward 
way to achieve this is to require that IR1 satisfies Th(JRe). 
Among others, we may then freely use classically defin­
able notions. But we can go even one step further. First, 
some definitions. An L-theory T is called model-complete 
iff for any pair ofT -models M and N, if N is an extension 
of M, then N is an elementary extension of M, i.e. every 
L-sentence with parameters from M is true in N iff it 
holds in M. In other words, as far as first-order logic is 
concerned, elementary extensions don't bring anything 
new. Another equivalent way to put it is to say that T u 
{<pI M I= <p, <p quantifier-free L(M)-formula} is complete 
in L(M), i.e. L extended by constants for the elements of 
M. Now Wilkie has shown the following [Dri 94]. 
Proposition 3.1 Th(IRe) is model-complete. 
That is, by assuming that our IRe-extension IR1 validates 
Th(IRe), we can ensure that every classical result about 
IRe, obtained by any means but expressible in LEp(R), 
also holds in IR1• In other words, that IR1 is an elementary 
extension of Re. But Wilkie was also able to prove that 
Th(IRe) is o-minimal, which means that the only para­
meter-definable sets {aeF I I F l=<p(ll), <p(x)ELEF} in its 
models IF are finite unions of open intervals and points. 
From this it follows that all the strictly positive infini­
tesimals in IR1 satisfy the same LEp(R)-formulas with a 
single free variable. In fact, unary properties in the realm 
of smallness are completely fixed by the limit-behaviour 
of the standard reals. 
Proposition 3.2 Let IR1= (R1, 0, 1, +, x, exp, <) be a 
proper extension oflRe satisfying Th(JRe) and e, -r > 0 
be infinitesimals in IR1• Then, for all <p(x)e LEp(R), IR1 I= 
<p(e) iff there is 0 < re R' s.t. for all se R1, 0 < s < r im­
plies IR1 I= <p(s) iff there is 0 < re R s.t. for all se R, 0 < s 
< r implies IR I= <p(s) iff IR1 I= <p(I). 
This means in particular that there are no privilegued non­
zero infinitesimal values, which corresponds well to our 
intuitions about the indiscernibility of infinitesimals. We 
cannot differentiate infinitely small numbers independent­
ly from other nonstandard reference points. Hence, each 
infinitesimal might be called prototypical or generic in the 
context of Th(IRe). Observe that all this would not be true 
if we could refer to an integer concept allowing the dis­
tinction of odd- and evenness. We are now ready to pro­
vide a more formal defmition of our extended probability 
measures. 
Definition 3.2 Let IR' be a Th(IRe)-model extending IRe 
and :B = (B, n, u, -, 0, 1) be a boolean algebra. The 
function P : B -> R' is called an IR'-valued nonarchi­
medean probability measure iff for all A, Be B, P(A) � 0, 
P(l) = 1 and P(AuB) = P(A) + P(B)for disjoint A, B. It 
is called coherent i/P(A) = 0 only holds for A= 0. 
Suppose, P is an IR'-valued probability measure on B, 
and {Ai I i �Nat} a subset ofB s.t. Ai n A j = 0 for i,;:. j, 
P(Ai) = 1/21+1 and A= U:BAi (unique least upper bound 
w.r.t.lJ). But then, because the infmite sum of the P(Ai) 
is just defmed �o be the supremum of the partial smns Si = 
1/2 + ... + 1121+ 1, which doesn't exist in IR' (for any 
potential limit s, we would get Si < s - E < s for all i), we 
cannot set P (A) = EP(Ai), i.e. we cannot assume a­
additivity. Coherence, i.e. respecting impossibility, can 
only be a facultative requirement given that important 
classical distributions like the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1] 
violate this principle. In practice, however, we are mostly 
concerned with restrictions of IR '-valued measures to 
boolean algebras of definable sets or Lindenbaum-alge­
bras :BL. Note that we may construct from a given coher­
ent nonarchimedean probability measure P: B -> [0, l]R• 
a corresponding canonical ranking measure :R. P by identi­
fying those values a, b in [0, l]R· which are <<-incom­
parable (not a << b or b << a) and taking the quotient 
structure. The ranking algebra resulting from this cons­
truction will be dense, contrasting with the discrete !C-ran­
king structures. We get the following extendibility result 
Proposition 3.3 Let .I be a boolean subalgebra of the 
power-set-algebra 1>ow(S), IR' be as above and P be an 
IR'-valued probability measure on B .  Then there is a 
Th(IRe)-model m" extending IR' and an lR"-valued pro­
bability measure P' on Pow(S) extending P. 
What is the real meaning of infinitesimal probabilities ? 
Certainly, it seems hard to imagine any objective, statisti­
cal interpretation, in particular because of our indiscer­
nibility result. That is, we have to adopt a subjectivist 
perspective. Then, their role is three-fold. To begin with, 
they provide a rough classification of propositions accor­
ding to their respective relevance or order of magnitude. 
For an arbitrary infinitesimal e, P(A I B) = e practically 
means that within the context B - at least for finite 
boolean algebras - we should neglect the alternative A for 
utility considerations and decision-taking. Similar to ran­
king measure values, they allow us to express absolute 
and relative ne�igibility. Of course, this could be done as 
well through :R. . The fine-grained distinctions offered by 
the extended probabilistic scale matter when extreme con­
ditioning on neglected evidence has to occur and we have 
to revise probabilities (e.g. to prepare a decision). So, 
their second task is to supply a coherent framework for 
borderline conditionalizations and more subtle compa­
risons within the same order of magnitude. Last but not 
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least, we are going to nse them in the following for more 
fine-grained interpretations of default knowledge and re­
asoning, trying to accommodate established probabilistic 
inference mechanisms to our extended framework and 
thereby to defeasible inference. 
To conclude, some words about previous uses of non­
standard probabilities in the context of default reasoning 
and belief revision. Spohn [Spo 90] exploited this notion 
to interpret and justify his discrete -.c-ranking revision 
qamework. He did so by associating K(A) = i with P(A) = 
e1 for an arbitrary but fixed infinitesimal E. Nonstandard 
valuations admitting infinitesimals were also used in [LM 
92] for a probabilistic reinterpretation of ranked models. 
A difference with our approach is that they worked within 
the traditional formal context of nonstandard analysis [Sto 
77]. That is, they extended not only the real number field 
but also the corresponding set theory, which is much more 
than we need and want to do regarding our intuitions and 
intentions. We make only those assumptions necessary to 
model defaults and defeasible inference in a more fme­
grained probabilistic context. The adequacy of our way to 
proceed is guaranteed by the previously mentioned model 
theoretic results. There have been other proposals combin­
ing the probabilistic with the ranking measure perspective, 
e.g. counterfactual probabilities [Bou 93] and cumulative 
measures [Wey 94], but these heterogeneous approaches 
are sometimes less adequate. For practical purposes, of 
course, they may still constitute a real alternative. 
4 DEFAULTKNOWLEDGE 
Infmitesimal probabilities are certainly a very natural way 
to encode the notion of "negligibility" or "extreme small­
ness", which is at the center of our descriptive default 
philosophy. However, interpreting defaults by nonarcbi­
medean conditional probability constraints is not entirely 
straightforward. The reason is that we have to deal with a 
multitude of possible interpretations, which may produce 
different results. In what follows, let L be a classical pro­
positional or flrst-order language and P be a nonarcbime­
dean IR'-valued probability measure on the correspond­
ing Lindenbaum algebra iJL. To implement the attribute 
extreme smallness, a subset of [0, l]R· must satisfy at least 
two conditions, namely downwards closure and infini­
tesimality. Therefore, in our framework, the translation of 
a default <p -»'I' (<p, 'I' L-formulas) will always take the 
form of an infmitesimal positive initial interval constraint, 
• 
<p -» 'If : P( --iV I <p) E l.p _,. v• with 
[0, l]R· ;.;;;2 �q,_,. v,;:. 0, s.t. for all v E lcp-• v• 0::; v << 1 
and 0 S w $ v implies w E Iq, _,. v· 
Observe that we allow our intervals to depend on <p -»'I'· 
To define lcp _,. v• we may now choose between different 
comparison relations (<, s, <<,�and bounds (infmi­
tesimal terms, 1). But, what are the most appropriate stra­
tegies for translating the descriptive content of defaults by 
such constraints ? Here, we have to take into account not 
only our intuitions about the intended logical behaviour of 
defaults, e.g. w.r.t. Lehmann's conditional axioms, but 
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also the possible defeasible inference policies which will 
have to exploit this encoding of default knowledge. An 
obvious choice would be to use the canonical ranking 
measure construction and to transfer the corresponding 
default interpretations. This would give us three kinds of 
constraints based on the magnitude relation <<. Let Eql-10 'II 
<< 1. Note that� stands for not>>. 
• cp -»'I': P(--\Jf I cp) << 1 (<<-classical), 
• cp-»'lf: P(-lJf l cp)<<Eql-» 'lf (<<-bounded), 
• cp -»'I': P(-\jll cp) �Eql-10 'II �-bounded). 
Recalling what we said about ranking measures and the 
fact that e << ...Je << 1 for e << 1, we see that the ftrst 
scheme guarantees the rules of rational, the second and 
the third one only those of preferential conditional logic. 
So, only the <<-classical interpretation shows the desired 
behaviour at the level of monotonic inference for defaults. 
The corresponding proof theory then allows us to trans­
form given default knowledge bases without changing 
their intended nonarchimedean probabilistic meaning. The 
precise syntactic form doesn't matter under these con­
ditions. Most old-fashioned default formalisms, like Rei­
ter's default logic, do not support such natural, content­
preserving manipulations. To simplify the overall valua­
tion context, we may try to restrict the values P can take, 
e.g. to polynomials over a ftxed infinitesimal £. In the 
context of ranking measures, this would correspond to the 
choice of a discrete ranking algebra. 
Another possibility would be to interpret all our defaults 
through infmitesimal, but otherwise classical threshold 
constraints using < or 5. 
• cp-»'1': P(-\jflcp)<Eql-»\11 (<-bounded), 
• cp -»'I' : P( -lJf I cp) � Eql-10 'II (�-bounded). 
These constraints, however, strongly conflict with almost 
all the classical postulates for default conditionals (e.g. 
conjunction on the right, reasoning by cases, cautious mo­
notony). Nevertheless, that doesn't make this interpreta­
tion worthless. For instance, �-boundedness is appropriate 
for implementing defeasible inference strategies based on 
generalized probabilistic techniques like nonarchimedean 
entropy maximization. Furthermore, on an intuitive level, 
this interpretation and the <<-classical one are quite close 
to each other. In fact, asking P(-\jll cp) to be<< 1, i.e. to 
be� than some (generic) infinitesimal, doesn� seem to be 
so different from asking it to be� than a fixed (generic) 
infinitesimal, given the indiscernibility result from Prop. 
3.2. Of course, this argument breaks down if we consider 
not one but several infinitesimal bounds in parallel (e.g. 
P(-lJI 1 cp)  � e and P(-lJI' I cp') � e' = e2). So, it is not 
completely obvious which translation strategy serves our 
needs best, because there seems to be a surprising trade­
off between having a suitable monotonic logic for defaults 
and getting nice nonmonotonic inference relations to ex­
ploit them. 
5 DEFAULT INFERENCE 
In its traditional form, defeasible reasoning has been 
mainly concerned with finite splitted knowledge bases of 
the type I: u a, where I:= { cpi I i � nl:} is a set of facts 
from L and a = {'l'i -» 'l''i I i � n11} a collection of 
defaults over L, whose role is to guide a plausible reason­
ing process starting at I:. The task of any - necessarily 
nonmonotonic - plausible inference relation II= is to tell 
us, given facts and defaults, what we might reasonably ex­
pect or assume beyond certainty, i.e. which 'I' should be 
defeasibly inferred (is a plausible consequence ofllia). 
• { cpj I i � nl:} u {'l'i -» 'l''i I i � nil} II="'. 
For each a, we can then define a finitary consequence 
relation l=a on L by setting I: l=a 'I' iff I: u a II= 'I'· 
Currently, a rather broad consensus has been reached 
about the minimal requirements for such factual inference 
relations l=a (but not for interactions between defaults). 
They are at least required to be preferential for ftnite 
premise sets [KLM 90]. We do not ask for rational mono­
tony, because sometimes, we may want to construct new 
inference relations by taking the intersection of existing 
ones and to see I= a as giving only a partial approximation 
of some ideal plausible relationships, which conflicts with 
the above principle. Concerning the full relation II= and 
the impact of a, however, there doesn't exist a general 
agreement about which postulates to adopt, in particular if 
the basic default notion is allowed to violate the rules of 
preferential conditional logic. For us, the primary criterion 
is the existence of a semantic justification which doesn't 
conflict with the probabilistic perspective and might even 
be justified by probabilistic considerations. So, let's tum 
now to default inference in the context of our nonarchi­
medean framework of IR' -valued probability measures. 
The basic idea governing the defeasible inference philo­
sophy we are going to adopt here is that 
Default reasoning slwuld be anchored - on an abstract, 
ideal level - in the comparison of nonarchimedean pro­
babilistic belief valuations ordered according to some 
suitable version of the minimal informational commitment 
principle. 
More precisely, we adopt the following four-step strategy. 
1. Finiteness. Fix a background language L, closed under 
the usual propositional connectives, and a corresponding 
monotonic inference relation 1-, closed under the rules of 
propositional logic, s.t. 1- induces on L a ftnite Linden­
baum algebra �L <BL being the quotient of L over logical 
equivalence -11-). This should be enough for �ost practical 
representational purposes. We may then restnct ourselves 
to fmitary measures, which greatly simpliftes matters. 
2. Nonarchimedean constraints. Translate a given finite 
default collection a into a set of infinitesimal conditional 
probability constraints. Several important choices have to 
be made in this context. First of all, if explicit default 
strengths or preferences have not been given, we must 
decide whether our default translation procedure 'T should 
fix a single infinitesimal bound for all the defaults or in­
troduce a particular one for each individual default. Next, 
we have to choose suitable numerical comparison rela­
tions linking bounds and admissible values. 
• 'J: A= {'Vi-» 'l''i I i :$; n,i} -> {P(--ll''i I 'l'i)E IiI i :$; n,i} 
The main question here is whether the constraint areas Ii 
should be closed under addition (requiring <<). If not, the 
intervals should at least be closed w.r.t the order-topolo­
gy induced by < (requiring :s;). This gives us three major 
interpretation strategies 'J for A, resulting in 
• A'T«l = {P(--lV'i I 'l'i) << 1 I i :$; n,i}, 
• A 'J'l.,s = {P( --ll''i I 'lfi) :s; e I i :s; n.i} fore << 1, 
• A 'J'l.,p = {P( --ll''i I 'lfi) :s; Ei I i :s; n.i} for Ei << 1.  
Note that the constraints from the last two sets are open 
schemes with infinitesimal parameters e, Ei. We call 'J «1 
the classical-bounded, 'J � 8 the single-bounded and 'J � 
the plural-bounded nonarchimedean probabilistic defauft 
translation policy. 
3. Preferential entropy reasoning. Implement the mi­
nimal information principle within a preferential frame­
work. This is achieved by defming a partial order on fini­
tary IR'-valued probability distributions which gives prio­
rity to informationally less committed valuations, i.e. to 
those making the least additional assumptions given the 
knowledge at hand. To this end, we have to choose an ap­
propriate information measure. The standard proposal in 
the literature is the entropy concept Entropy is in fact a 
privilegued measure for the lack of information which can 
be justified by uniqueness results for different sets of 
postulates. Similarly, entropy maximization is a distin­
guished method in probabilistic inference [Jay 78, PV 90]. 
Because the axioms for RCE-fields already guarantee the 
existence of a logarithm function corresponding to exp, 
we may directly use the classical entropy definition in IR' 
as well. Let P be a nonarchimedean IR'-valued probability 
distribution on a finite boolean algebra .n with atoms 
A1, ... ,An. Then the (IR'-)entropy H(P) of P is defined by 
• H(P) = -:Dli where Si = P(Ai) x log(P(Ai)) if P(Ai) ::F- 0 
and Si = 0 if P(Ai) = 0 Oimit value). 
H(P) takes its maximum log(n) for the uniform distribu­
tion po on .n (with P0(Ai) = 1/n). Note that H is invariant 
under atom permutations. For the standard valuation 
structure, it is well-known that every set of linear :S;- cons­
traints {l:P(Ai)aji :s; bj, 0 :s; P(Ai), l:P(Ai) = 1 I 1 :s; i :s; n, 
jeJ} over (P(AJ), ... , P(An)), which determines a convex 
subset of [0, l ]n, has a unique entropy-maximizing solu­
tion. But note that we may think of other interesting con­
ditions, e.g. concerned with independence, which cannot 
be expressed by linear means and may require at least 
polynomial expressions. Now, because IR' is an elemen­
tary extension of IRe, all the LEp(R)-expressible results 
about entropy-maximization in classical fmitary contexts, 
can be immediately transferred to IR', where they hold as 
well. Based on H, we can then defme our entropy-based 
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information-ordering <E, a total pre-order on fmitary IR'­
valued probability distributions P: B -> [0, l]R'· 
• P <E P' iff H(P') < H(P) 
It is easy to see that the constraint sets A 'J provided by the 
plural- or single-bounded translation policy can be writ­
ten as sets of linear weak inequality constraints over the 
atom probabilities P(Ai). Therefore, assuming satisfiabili­
ty, there exists a unique <�minimallR'-valued distribu­
tion P* over .n verifying 11 • For constraints based on <, 
<< or �. however, there might be no <E-minima at all. 
Fortunately, we may still use the partial order <E to defme 
a preferential consequence relation II=E on all LEp(R')­
sentences with constants P(Ai). All we have to do - be­
cause <E is neither well-ordered nor otherwise well-be­
haved - is to adopt the limit evaluation strategy. That is, if 
P.n is the set of IR'-valued distributions over .n, 
• <I>(P(AJ), ... , P(An)) II=E 'lf(P(AJ); ... , P(An)) iff 
in PB, for every P validating <1>, there is a P' :s;E P 
verifying <I>, s.t for aliP" :s;E P' satisfying <I>, 'If holds. 
4. Defeasible entailment relations. Defme for every in­
terpretation strategy 'J a corresponding defeasible entail­
ment notion II='J based on II=E· i.e. entropy maximization 
in nonarchimedean contexts. The general idea is to deter­
mine the relationship between a fmite premise set I:, re­
presented by the conjunction of its elements cp, and a po­
tential plausible conclusion 'I' by evaluating the conditio­
nal probability P(-ijf I cp) for the <E-most-preferred distri­
butions verifying A'T. The nonmonotonic inference step 
should succeed iff P(--ll' I cp) is extremely small for all 
these P, i.e. P(--ll' I cp) << 1. This guarantees that II='J is 
preferential for fixed A. Rational monotony cannot be re­
quired because usually, l: offers only a partial (defeasible) 
description of P. Given that we may not omit any possible 
instan-tiation of the free unspecified infinitesimal 
parameters Ei (i :s; n,i) in A'T, we are going to accept only 
defeasible conclusions which are independent from the 
exact values. To realize this, we proceed by universal 
quantification. Now, we are ready for our general 
defeasible entailment scheme. Let I: = { cpj I i :s; n,J, A = 
{'Vi-» 'l''i I i :s; n,i} and cp = cpo& .. &cpnt. Then, 
• l: u A II='J 'I' iff for all f{), ••. , Ent << 1, 
A'T(f{), ... , Env II=E P(-,'lfl cp) << 1. 
It immediately follows from this definition that II='J is 
finitarily preferential for ftxed A'T, for 'J = 'J�.s. 'J�.p· 'J «1· 
In this paper, we have and will mainly consider standard 
finite default sets. But, it is important to note that our 
entailment strategy is in fact applicable to arbitrary 
constraint sets over nonarchimedean probability measures 
on some given fmite boolean algebra. Furthermore, if we 
are willing to accept a technically slightly more deman­
ding framework, it is even possible to handle infinite 
boolean algebras. For practical (normative) purposes, 
however, fixed finite contexts seem to be sufficient. 
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6 EXAMPLES AND COMPARISONS 
To become more acquainted with our nonarchimedean en­
tropy-maximizing entailment strategies, we are now going 
to illustrate the core approaches ll=::;;,p, 11=:::;,8 and ll=«t by 
their impact on some relevant inference patterns and -
roughly - investigate their links with other popular ac­
counts from the literature. Notably preferential ll=pc and 
rational closure II=Rc [LM 92] (equivalently, for finite 
sets of conditionals, system Z [Pea 90] or elementary hy­
perentailment [Wey 93, 95]), lexicographic closure II=Lc 
[Leh 92, BCDLP 93], conditional entailment ll=cE [GP 
92], maximum-entropy entailment II=ME [GMP 90, Gol 
92] and random-worlds entailment II=Rw [BGHK 93]. 
The maximum-entropy-based formalism for defeasible 
reasoning investigated by Goldszmidt is - contrasting with 
ours - mainly defined for simple default sets interpreted 
according to 'J::;;,s and based on a slightly more cumber­
some limiting probability strategy. Nonetheless, it gives 
the same results as ll=s;,s for standard default knowledge 
bases. This readily follows from Prop. 3.2. A similar re­
mark holds for the random-worlds approach of [BGHK 
93], which in fact intends to handle more powerful first­
order languages. It combines a somewhat limited appro­
ximation methodology with a limiting counting strategy 
based on very far-reaching indifference assumptions for 
finite first-order models. This causes difficulties with pre­
mises lacking finite models. Last but not least, it should 
be mentioned that the consequence relation lh<t, which is 
based on the most liberal interpretation strategy 'J «l• turns 
out to be equivalent to preferential closure ll=pc. Because 
the constraint interval here is just the set of all positive in­
finitesimals (in the given IR'), there is a lot of variability 
when doing entropy-maximization. That's why only the 
basic <<-relationships restrict the set of admissible non­
archimedean probability distributions (through the rules of 
probability theory and the definition of«). 
To begin with, we describe several - in our eyes desirable 
- strict and defeasible (non-)inference features. This list is, 
of course, not intended to be exhaustive or even represen­
tative in a precise sense. It only collects some interesting 
principles helping us to discriminate, situate and evaluate 
plausible consequence relations, providing at least a sur­
vey of the relevant issues. In the following, we shall as­
sume that ex, �. "(, cp, 'I' are logically independent formulas 
from L. Also, we concentrate on standard finite default 
sets Ll. 
Rat0 : Object-level rationality. 
• -» satisfies the rules of rational conditional logic. 
These are intuitively appealing for normal implication. 
Pre : Meta-level preferentiality. 
• For constant Ll, II= defmes a preferential consequence 
relation on facts. 
Fundamental requirement for factual plausible inference. 
Rat: Meta-level rationality. 
• For constant Ll, II= defmes a rational consequence 
relation on facts. 
At the meta-level, rational monotony is not really re­
quired, but sometimes practical. 
ES : Extended specificity. 
• { cp} u { cp -» ex, ex-» �. � -» 'If, ex -»--W} II= -\If. 
Extended version of the most-specific-subclass principle, 
a basic postulate for plausible reasoning with defaults. 
EI : Inheritance through exceptional subclasses. 
• {ex} u { ex->> �. ex -»--lJf, � -» 'If, � -» cp} II= cp. 
The formalism should be able to handle implicit indepen­
dence assumptions coherently. The exceptionality of ex in 
� should not affect the inheritance of cp. 
GE : Geffner's example. 
• { ex&�&y} u { ex->>--,� r ->)--,� ex&�->> 'I'} Ill= 'I'· -,'I£ 
Because ex&� and r are unrelated, there is no reason to 
prefer 'I' or --iJf, given ex&�&y. 
AP : Anti-prioritization. 
• { exv(�&y)} u {T ->)--,li T ->>-f(, exv� ->>-a:} Ill= --, ex. 
If � and y are negligible w.r.t. T and ex w.r.t. �. then ex­
pecting ex to be negligible w.r.t. �&y seems completely 
unjustifiable given the presumable exceptionality of �&y 
w.r.t. � (cf. EO. Recall that A->> B = "A&--,B is negligible 
w.r.t. A(&B)". 
RE : Redundancy. 
• { --,cp} u {T ->> cp, T ->> cpV'If} Ill== 'I'· 
Assuming right weakening for ->>, T ->> cpV'If would be­
come redundant, so we should infer nothing which does 
not already follow from --cp and T ->> cp ("syntax-indepen­
dency"). 
NE : Neutralization. 
• { --,cp} u {T ->> cp, T ->>'If, --cpv--, '1'->>--,cp} Ill= 'I' 
From the perspective of preferential conditional logic, the 
default T ->> 'I' is the only one which may be considered 
redundant. But then, given --cp, there is no longer any 
reason to expect 'I'· Note that this argument holds in par­
ticular in a situation where the default --cpv--,'1' -»--ip has 
been replaced by the corresponding strict implication and 
the similarity with RE becomes more obvious. 
Now, let's see how the defeasible entailment relations 
mentioned above are handling these "benchmark tests". 
This will give us a general impression of their overall be­
haviour and help us to detect major strengths and weak­
nesses. To compute the inferences for 11=:::;,8 and ll=::;;,p, we 
may use the algorithms described in [Gol 92]. Satis­
faction is indicated by 1, violation by 0. 
Principles : Rat0 Pre Rat ES EI GE AP RE NE 
• ll=�.p 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
• ll=�,s 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
• ll=«t 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
• II=Rc 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
• ll=cE 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
• II=Lc 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
All this seems to support our view that nonmonotonic 
reasoning based on infinitesimal probabilistic knowledge 
is a natural generalization of classical probabilistic infer­
ence and defeasible reasoning with default conditionals. It 
is particularly well-suited to exploit entropy maximiza­
tion techniques, offering us very plausible results backed 
by foundational considerations which are also valid for in­
finitesimal contexts. Of course, on the other hand, we 
must see that existing ME-based formalisms are computa­
tionally reasonable only or mainly for irredundant default 
sets, i.e. where no abnormality part A&-,B is covered by 
the abnormality parts of the remaining defaults. But such 
a restriction is hardly appealing. However, recent results 
have indicated that it could be possible to approximate 
pure ME-default inference by using more practical rank­
ing-based consequence relations admitting nonarchime­
dean probabilistic justifications. They would allow ?s to 
combine rational conditional logic for defaults w1th a 
mechanism for exploiting implicit independence assump­
tions, e.g. to realize Rat0 and El, which is beyond the 
scope of the formalisms mentioned above [W ey 95]. 
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